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As was perhaps inevitable following the High Court decisions in Fitzwilliam v Richall 
Holdings ([2013] EWHC 86 (Ch); [2013] 1 P. & C.R. 19), and Swift 1
st
 v Chief Land 
Registrar ([2014] All E.R. (D) 12 (Feb)), the Court of Appeal has finally been given 
the opportunity to consider the guarantees provided by registration of title; the 
meaning of rectification of the register; and the process of indemnity, in the appeal in 
Swift 1
st
 ([2015] EWCA Civ 330). The court, in deciding that whenever B derives title 
under a forged disposition, B will be entitled to an indemnity following the 
rectification of the register, concluded that Malory v Cheshire Homes ([2002] EWCA 
Civ 151; [2002] Ch. 216) was decided per incuriam. This will be welcomed by many. 
There are, however, still some unanswered questions, not least the position of a 
registered proprietor who loses title but where they have not relied on a forgery in 
good faith. In addition, the general tenor of the case is somewhat at odds with Gold 
Harp Properties v McLeod & Others ([2014] EWCA Civ 1084; [2015] 1 W.L.R. 
1249), the other recent decision of the Court of Appeal in this area, and there is a 
potential for conflict when the two cases are read together. Thus we still await a court 
willing to draw together the tentacles of land registration, giving us a complete picture 
as to what the statutory magic of guaranteed title achieves. Perhaps, however, the 
provisions contained in the Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002) are not amenable 
to the creation of a single picture of the scope of their power.  
  
Mrs Rani was registered proprietor of the property in question. Unbeknownst to her, a 
fraudulent charge was executed and registered in favour of Swift 1
st
. Once the forgery 
came to light (following an application seeking possession by Swift 1
st
), Mrs Rani 
requested, and Swift 1
st
 consented to, the removal of the forged charge from the 
register. Swift 1
st
 applied to the Land Registry for an indemnity to cover their losses. 
The High Court decided that notwithstanding the decision in Fitzwilliam, and the 
Court of Appeal decision in Malory, Swift 1
st
 was entitled to such an indemnity 
because of the statutory fiction employed by schedule 8, paragraph 1(2)(b) LRA 
2002, which states that where registration has taken place on the basis of a forged 
disposition, the disposition should be treated as valid for the purposes of assessing 
loss. The Chief Registrar appealed against this decision.  
 
Patten L.J., giving the sole judgment, held that paragraph 1(2)(b) did entitle Swift 1
st
 
to an indemnity, at [51]. To reach this conclusion, he reasoned, firstly, that, in order to 
obtain an indemnity, it needed to be shown that the removal of Swift 1
st’s charge 
constituted rectification of the register due to some prejudicial effect on them upon 
losing their charge, at [27, 39]. To demonstrate this, it needed to be shown that Swift 
1
st
 had more than a bare legal title to their charge, at [39], a title which was always 
subject to Mrs Rani’s right to rectify (which overrode the charge thanks to her actual 
occupation, LRA 2002, Schedule 3, paragraph 2 and at [45]). This required some 
assessment as to the authority of Malory. The judge held that whilst it was not 
possible to distinguish Malory, at [40], the decision should be considered per 
incuriam, at [45]. Furthermore, although Mrs Rani appeared to have an overriding 
interest to rectify the register, it was held that paragraph 1(2)(b) meant that Swift’s 
charge must be treated as though it was not a forgery for the purposes of calculating 
their losses, at [51]. As a result, Swift 1
st
 had suffered a substantial loss for the 
purposes of schedule 4 and 8 of the LRA 2002.  
 
The starting point for discussion of this decision is Malory v Cheshire Homes. 
Although the judge at first instance had managed to construe the statutory provisions 
in such a way as to ‘work around’ Malory (at [39] and [44] of that judgment), the 
Court of Appeal has reached a more satisfactory outcome by finding that the 
conclusion that a new registered proprietor would hold on trust for the old proprietor 
where the transfer was forged was reached per incuriam, at [41]. In Malory, Arden 
L.J. held that although legal title was guaranteed by (the then) s 69 Land Registration 
Act 1925 (now, in a different form, s 58 LRA 2002), equitable title was not, at [65]. 
Thus, following a void disposition, although legal title would be vested in the new 
registered proprietor, they would hold on trust for the former registered proprietor. 
The decision had been subject to much and sustained criticism (E. Cooke, ‘Chickens 
coming home to roost’ [2014] Conv. 444; E. Cooke, ‘The register’s guarantee of title’ 
[2013] Conv. 344; M. Dixon, ‘A not so conclusive title register?’ (2013) 129 L.Q.R. 
320; E. Lees, ‘Richall Holdings v Fitzwilliam: Malory v Cheshire Homes and the 
LRA 2002’ (2013) 76 M.L.R. 924).  
 
Such criticism came from two perspectives. Firstly, the case fatally undermined the 
point of registration, since it meant that only bare legal title could ever be conferred 
by registration, robbing the guarantee of title provided by the register of any value (E. 
Cooke, ‘The register’s guarantee of title’ [2013] Conv. 344, 350). It was thus 
inconsistent with the principles underpinning the LRA 2002. Secondly, it was 
problematic because of the mechanism by which the equitable interest was said to 
arise (E Lees, ‘Richall Holdings v Fitzwilliam: Malory v Cheshire Homes and the 
LRA 2002’ (2013) 76 M.L.R. 924, 930-932). There was nothing which could be said 
to trigger the imposition of the trust, and thus the case was at odds with Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC ([1996] 2 A.C. 669; [1996] 2 All E.R. 961). 
These criticisms, persuasive as they are, were not enough however to doom Malory. 
Patten L.J. highlighted however that Arden L.J.’s comments were made without 
reference to the earlier decision in Argyle Building Society v Hammond (1984) 49 P. 
& C.R. 148; (1984) 81 L.S.G. 3425), at [42], and without taking account of s 114 of 
the LRA 1925, at [43-44]. Thus, he felt able to conclude that this point was per 
incuriam,  at [45].  
 
This aspect of the decision will be almost universally welcomed (except perhaps, one 
assumes, by the Land Registry, for whom it will almost certainly give rise to a more 
uncertain, and greater, costs liability for indemnity). The “heresy” (E. Cooke, ‘Land 
registration: void and voidable titles - a discussion of the Scottish Law Commission's 
paper’ [2004] Conv. 482, 486) of Malory has been put to bed.  
 
With Malory out of the way, the next issue was to determine whether Swift 1
st’s 
charge, although no longer “bare”, was nevertheless always flawed due to the fact that 
Mrs Rani had an interest in the form of a right to rectify the register, which, thanks to 
her actual occupation, was overriding under schedule 3, paragraph 2 LRA 2002. The 
Court of Appeal held that whilst she did have such an interest, and whilst in general, 
alteration to give effect to an overriding interest does not constitute rectification (Re 
Chowood’s Registered Land, [1933] 1 Ch. 574, and at [20]), in cases of forgery, 
paragraph 1(2)(b) deems that the alteration is prejudicial, and thus can constitute a 
rectification, at [51].  
 
The provision states that: 
“(b) the proprietor of a registered estate or charge claiming in good faith 
under a forged disposition is, where the register is rectified, to be 
regarded as having suffered loss by reason of such rectification as if the 
disposition had not been forged”. 
 
The statutory provision provides that for the purposes of calculating loss it must be 
assumed that the disposition was valid. This provision is however capable of two 
interpretations. Firstly, it could mean that the fact of its being forged is ignored for the 
purposes of assessing prejudice and loss, but not for the purposes of assessing 
priority, so that a right to rectify could still have priority, depriving the registered 
interest of any value, at [50]. Secondly, it could mean that the fact of its being forged 
is ignored for the purposes of assessing prejudice and loss, and, for the purposes of 
priority, so that any right to rectify the register, overriding or not, would not pose a 
barrier to obtaining an indemnity.  
 
The court held that the latter interpretation was correct (at [51]) on the basis that 
otherwise paragraph 1(2)(b) would be a circular, dead-letter provision, at [49]. There 
is a narrow class of circumstances where it might still be useful, at [47] – where there 
was no overriding right to rectify – but, the court held, this is not what was intended 
by the drafter of the legislation, at [51]. Rather, the court concluded: 
“That a right to seek rectification in these circumstances is capable of 
subsisting as an overriding interest does not alter the fact that the registered 
proprietor seeking the indemnity is claiming in good faith under a forged 
disposition and is to be regarded as having suffered loss by reason of the 
rectification of the register as if the disposition had not been forged (Patten 
L.J.’s emphasis)”, at [51]. 
Patten L.J. reasoned that the Law Commission Report, and the statute itself, would 
have to have been much clearer had the alternative interpretation been the one 
intended, at [51]. Thus statutory magic – the make-believe of the valid transfer – 
provides for a win-win – for the parties; and lose, for the Land Registry.  
 
The outcome of this is relatively straightforward in cases of forgery. Taken together, 
the result, as it was for Swift 1
st
, is that when B derives title to an estate under a 
forged disposition, whether or not A has the benefit of an overriding interest, B will 
be entitled to an indemnity following the rectification of his interest off the register 
since, by schedule 8 paragraph 1(2)(b), he is statutorily deemed to have suffered loss. 
But this relatively straightforward situation reveals complexities on further inspection. 
Firstly, the provision only covers cases of forgery. What is the position where no such 
forgery has occurred? Secondly, how does the approach work with that of the Court 
of Appeal in Gold Harp where the possibility of an overriding right to rectify was 
doubted, and titles were seen as being subject to much more than simply those rights 
which were registered, or which overrode? These fundamental questions remain 
unanswered by Swift 1
st
.  
 
Firstly, where there is no forgery involved in a mistaken registration, as, for example, 
in Knights Construction v Roberto Mac ([2011] EWLandRA 2009_1459; [2011] 2 
E.G.L.R. 123), but rather a simple error, if, at the time of registration, there was an 
overriding interest allowing the former registered proprietor to rectify, it appears that 
because of that interest, the new proprietor would not be entitled to an indemnity. 
This means that the proprietor registered because of a non-forged, but nevertheless 
mistaken conveyance, would not be entitled to an indemnity, whereas his lucky 
compatriot whose loss arose from forgery, rather than mistake, would be so entitled. 
This is not to say that there is no justification for drawing a line between forgeries and 
all other cases of mistaken registration, and indeed, the statute does draw such a line, 
but simply to highlight that the approach in Swift 1
st
, which relies so heavily in 
paragraph 1(2)(b), as opposed to, for example, s 58, raises this issue. In short, the 
court never gets to the heart of the issue raised by cases such as this: what does the 
fact of being registered mean that you are entitled to if that register is changed, and 
why? 
 
The consequence is that under the present approach, cases of forgery are treated 
differently from all other cases. Whilst this is not the place fully consider whether 
forgery is ‘special’ – there has been extensive discussion elsewhere of the justice 
inherent in both strong, and flexible, interpretations of the guarantee of title provided 
by the register (E. Lees, ‘Title by registration- rectification, indemnity and mistake 
and the Land Registration Act 2002’ (2013) 76 M.L.R. 62; A. Goymour, ‘Mistaken 
registrations of land: exploding the myth of “title by registration”’ (2013) 72 C.L.J. 
617; S. Cooper, ‘Resolving title conflicts in registered land’ (2015) 131 L.Q.R. 108), 
it should be noted, that forgery is not unique. A forged disposition is a void 
disposition. But so too is a mistaken disposition, or a disposition where the transferee 
did not have capacity to transfer. Similarly, although a forged disposition is deceitful 
and fraudulent, not all fraud involves forgery. To single out forgery as being 
somehow different from all other land registration problems, at the very least, requires 
some thought.  
 
A second remaining issue is the possibility of the right to rectify existing as an 
overriding interest. The Court of Appeal accepts (albeit obiter) that the right is 
capable of being an overriding interest. This acceptance is itself notable given that the 
court in Gold Harp doubted the validity of such an argument, at [34]. It has been 
argued elsewhere that treating the right to rectify as governing cases of this sort 
produces a well-calibrated balance between innocent purchaser, and innocent 
proprietor, one of whom must lose out (in terms of land) in cases such as this, (E. 
Lees, ‘Rectification of the register – prospective or retrospective?’(2015) 78 M.L.R., 
349, 367-370).   
 
The reason why this approach has the potential to be so successful is that it protects 
the careful purchaser (thanks to the conditions in schedule 3, paragraph 2 relating to 
discoverability of actual occupation and the nature of an inquiries made), but also 
protects those from whom loss of their home, for example, might be particularly 
difficult. It is a test approximated to allocate the land to those who desire it the most. 
However, in such circumstances, if the right to rectify as an overriding interest 
prevents the grant of an indemnity, it would not produce such a satisfactory balance. 
Thus the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, that Swift 1
st
 would not be entitled to an 
indemnity were it not for paragraph 1(2)(b), even though they had lost something of 
value, (albeit that it was something always subject to an overriding interest) is 
unfortunate. The decision in Re Chowood, upon which this conclusion is based, 
makes sense where the overriding interest is a substantive right – a long equitable 
lease for example – but it may be doubted in cases where the right is a right to rectify, 
not least because the right is a discretionary one with presumptions in favour of 
proprietors in possession etc. (LRA 2002, schedule 4). The “procedural” aspects of 
this right to rectify may call into question the validity of the conclusion that a right 
subject to an overriding right to rectify is of no value. 
 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in Gold Harp did not consider rectification from the 
perspective of overriding interests. Instead, in their opinion, rectification appeared to 
be a stand-alone issue unrelated to questions of priority, and that therefore even if Mrs 
Rani was not in actual occupation, rectification could have taken place. According to 
Gold Harp therefore, the fact of there being an overriding interest is not relevant to 
questions of rectification and loss (M. Dixon, ‘Rectification and priority: further 
skirmishes in the land registration war’ (2015) 131 L.Q.R. 207). These two 
approaches sit at odds, and although both contrasting approaches are obiter, it might 
have been hoped that the interaction between the two would have been subject to 
some discussion, even if the matter could not have been conclusively settled.  
 
Thus, although there is much to be praised in this judgment – the aspect of the 
judgment relating to Malory is most welcome – some questions remain. These 
questions, however, are not really questions for the courts, who have now addressed 
the issues before them in an entirely sensible way, but for the drafting of the Act 
itself, and thus for the Law Commission in its forthcoming project 
(http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/land-registration.htm, and at [48]). The 
statutory provisions, have, in this author’s opinion, been interpreted ‘as correctly as 
possible’ in light of their aim, but the nature of the guarantee that the register provides 
is still uncertain. There is so much in this judgment which seems correct. Indeed, little 
criticism can be directed at the Court of Appeal here. Rather, the lack of commitment 
to any one understanding of registration which is apparent in the 2002 Act, is 
confirmed, if confirmation were needed. Whatever one’s view on the power of 
statutory magic, it is clear still not all is well in the murky world land registration of 
make-believe.  
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